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Automated Certification for Compliant Cloud-based
Business Processes
Cloud Computing workflows need to adhere to a variety of rules and offer high flexibility.
This is at odds with the compliance certification currently being carried out in a manual
fashion. The paper presents Comcert, an approach for the automated analysis of workflows.
If a workflow does not adhere to the given rules, re-usable rule patterns are used to pinpoint
the workflow vulnerabilities. The results of this design time analysis can be used as
certificate by Cloud providers to signal compliance. Auditors can check the rule adherence
of workflows before workflow execution, and thanks to the rule patterns certification is
open to scrutiny by customers. Companies which so far have refrained from Cloud
Computing because of Compliance concerns can use the new analysis approach to check
for rule adherence, and Cloud providers can demonstrate compliance through certificates.
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1 Automating the Certification
of Business Processes
Certifying the adherence of business pro-
cesses to compliance requirements is a
key issue in the large-scale deployment of
reliable Cloud Computing (Hayes 2009;
ENISA 2009; CSA 2009, 2010). It must
be checked that moving (parts of) busi-
ness processes into the Cloud does not vi-
olate existing rules, and that the processes
also adhere to new rules which the use
of Cloud Computing may bring along.
Currently, many companies refrain from
Cloud Computing because of compliance
considerations, most of all security and
privacy related ones.
Sustainable Cloud Computing includes
the capability of provably keeping con-
trol over processes’ compliance. How-
ever, two issues prevail on the way to
achieving certification. Firstly, tools for
automating certification procedures are
missing. In consequence, certification is
a long-winded, error-prone procedure.
This is at odds with the increased flex-
ibility stemming from the realization
of Clouds as a means for companies
to timely adapt their business processes
on demand. Secondly, the simultaneous
consideration of a multitude of regu-
lations and contractual rules increases
the complexity of checking compliance.
A uniform way of expressing the resulting
requirements has not yet been established
and research results are lacking (Breaux
2009 is a notable exception). Overall,
this situation and the associated risks of
noncompliance inhibit enterprises from
outsourcing their tasks onto the Cloud
(Chow et al. 2009) and, in general, pre-
vent the full realization of the economi-
cal potential of Cloud Computing (Etro
2009).
Addressing these two issues, this pa-
per presents a thorough classification
of compliance rules. Drawn from ma-
jor compliance regulations, the resul-
tant requirements categorization com-
prises three rule classes for which for-
mal patterns are provided. Building upon
this classification, the paper introduces
Comcert, an approach for the automated
compliance certification of business pro-
cesses. Comcert employs Petri nets (Mu-
rata 1989) as a notation-independent,
uniform formalism to specify both busi-
ness processes and compliance rules.
Similar to security automata (Schneider
2000), Petri net patterns modeling the
rules are analyzed in parallel to the pro-
cess specification, flagging when the pro-
cess structure indicates a rule violation.
This gives Comcert a constructive char-
acter as it automatically identifies design
vulnerabilities in process specifications.
Comcert thus contributes to automat-
ing the certification of processes in the
Cloud and, in consequence, fostering its
wider deployment. Allowing workflows
to be checked for compliance rules, in-
cluding security and privacy rules, Com-
cert helps to make Cloud Computing a
real option for companies. Due to the
use of a general Petri net formalism, the
approach does not rely on a particular
process notation, such as Business Pro-
cess Modeling Notation (BPMN), Busi-
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Fig. 1 Health care scenario with exemplary workflows
ness Process Execution Language (BPEL)
or Event-driven Process Chain (EPC).
Checking both the control flow and the
data flow for rule adherence, Comcert
provides well-founded, reliable evidence
of (non)compliance.
Section 2 presents the motivation be-
hind Comcert. Along with a Cloud-based
E-Health scenario with HIPAA rules as
running example, a description of Com-
cert’s use cases is given. Section 3 sum-
marizes a selection of compliance texts
and extracts a classification of compli-
ance rules. From the classification, rule
patterns will be derived in Sect. 4, which
also introduces the Comcert analysis al-
gorithm. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Scenario Illustration
Of the many regulations that include us-
age control requirements, the U.S. Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA 1996) is one of the most
detailed ones. HIPAA regulates the use
of protected health information (PHI)
in business processes. Figure 1 illustrates
the E-Health scenario, using exemplary
workflows and HIPAA rules. The sce-
nario comprises a Cloud-based provider
of electronic health records (EHR) and
local health providers such as hospitals
and dentists. Each party has its own
workflows, and some of the workflows
are connected to workflows of other par-
ties. Note that Fig. 1 is not an actual pro-
cess model, but a schematic representa-
tion of the involved parties, their work-
flows, and according HIPAA rules.
A workflow is a discrete and case-based
business process, i.e., it has a defined start
and end point and handles a specific in-
stance of a business process. The two
main characteristics of a workflow are its
control flow and its data flow. The control
flow describes which activities happen in
what order, and the data flow describes
which data and resources are exchanged
between these activities. For example, the
Cloud-based EHR provider in Fig. 1 runs
a workflow that contains a control flow
from the “request amendment” activity
to the “amend PHI” activity. The data
flow consists of the incoming request and
the PHI amendment between the two ac-
tivities.
In Fig. 1, a patient uses an online
EHR, such as Google Health or Microsoft
HealthVault offer. The EHR provider in-
teracts with third parties such as hospi-
tals and dentists. However, based on the
patient’s right to have her PHI amended
(HIPAA:164.526a), the patient may re-
quest – in this case, she does so through
the EHR provider – that third parties up-
date their records accordingly. Third par-
ties, in turn, are obliged to forward the
performed amendments to all other rel-
evant parties (HIPAA:164.526c). Accord-
ing to HIPAA:165.526e, these third par-
ties must accept the amendment and per-
form the corresponding updates.
The general scenario is that of a com-
pany which wants to use Cloud ser-
vices. Three questions result, one each re-
garding the company, the auditor(s) and
the company’s customers. First, the com-
pany would like to identify the parts of
its business processes that can be out-
sourced without violating rules regard-
ing, for example, the location of service
execution. Second, auditors have to check
the rule adherence of the (partially) out-
sourced business processes. Third, cus-
tomers should have the ability to assess
whether the “new” business processes
treat personal data in a way that con-
forms to privacy policies.
Current workflow analysis techniques
chiefly focus on control flow, i.e. on
the detection of activity errors caused
by flawed workflow design, e.g. van der
Aalst (2003), Ehrig et al. (2007), Wong
and Gibbons (2008). Ghose and Koliadis
(2007) – and similarly Governatori et al.
(2009) – present an approach for audit-
ing workflows for compliance that fo-
cuses on activities and time limits. These
approaches employ modal temporal logic
for the analysis of workflows specified
in BPMN. Focusing exclusively on data,
Meda et al. (2010) introduce an approach
for checking data flows, and Atluri et al.
(2001) present an approach for reasoning
about confidentiality properties in work-
flows. Monakova et al. (2009), Liu et al.
(2007), and Trčka et al. (2009) present an
approach for the automated verification
of BPEL processes which combines both
data flow and control flow perspectives.
These approaches neglect usage control
and, hence, cannot check for all of the
compliance requirements (see Sect. 3).
For this reason, Comcert includes usage
control checks.
Given a workflow model and a set of
rules, Comcert can answer all three ques-
tions. Technically, there really is only one
question: “Does workflow W adhere to
rule R?” From an organizational perspec-
tive, the three views company, auditor,
and customer differ because of the in-
formation being available to each. The
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company has all details at hand. The au-
ditor sees what the company gives him
– this can, but may not be every detail.
The customer sees little to none of the
business process’ details. In the following,
we focus on the technical rule adherence
check, assuming that the relevant pieces
of information are available. Third par-
ties, checking company details on behalf
of the customers and creating compliance
certificates for public display, will not be
further discussed in this article.
3 Compliance Regulation Survey
and Classification
Given the strong demand for compliance,
two questions emerge. First, which rules
do workflows have to adhere to? Second,
how can the rule adherence be checked?
The remainder of this section presents a
survey of compliance regulations to an-
swer the first question. Section 4 will an-
swer the second question by introducing
the Comcert approach.
3.1 Compliance Regulation Survey
OECD Guidelines The “OECD Guide-
lines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data”
(1980) define eight principles: the col-
lection limitation, data quality, pur-
pose specification, use limitation, secu-
rity safeguards, openness, individual par-
ticipation and the accountability prin-
ciple. Organizational processes are nec-
essary to, e.g., achieve high data qual-
ity through record updates, or to fol-
low the openness principle by inform-
ing customers about the uses of personal
data. Regarding workflows, the princi-
ples mainly concern the data flow. Data
collection should be limited (“collection
limitation”) to the amount required for
a specific purpose (“data quality”), and
data usage should not exceed that specific
purpose (“use limitation”).
European Community Directive 95/46/EC
Within the European Community, the
Directive 95/46/EC regulates “the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data” and “the
free movement of such data” (Euro-
pean Commission 1995). Workflows ad-
here to this directive if they use data
only for a specific and specified pur-
pose (95/46/EC:6.1.b) and do not use
more data than necessary for that pur-
pose (95/46/EC:6.1.c). Companies shall
keep identifying personal data only as
long as necessary for a certain purpose
(95/46/EC:6.1.e), shall obtain the cus-
tomer’s consent to use personal data
(95/46/EC:7.a), may not use certain
kinds of personal data (95/46/EC:8.1),
and have to inform customers about
how the companies use personal data
(95/46/EC:10,12). In general, the appro-
priate security mechanisms have to be
used (95/46/EC:17.1), and personal data
may only be transmitted to other coun-
tries if those countries provide an appro-
priate level of security and privacy for the
data (95/46/EC:25).
German Tele Media Act (TMG) The
TMG describes how and what personal
data may be collected and used by online
services (TMG 2009). Specifically, per-
sonal data (“personenbezogene Daten”)
may only be used in workflows if either
the law requires their use or the cus-
tomer has given her consent (TMG:12).
Companies must announce their privacy
policy (TMG:13). Service usage must be
possible without being observed by oth-
ers, and profiles may, if at all neces-
sary, only be created using pseudonyms
(TMG:13.4). Only the required personal
data shall be collected (TMG:15.1), and
billing shall not reveal usage details unless
otherwise agreed upon by the customer.
German Federal Data Protection Act
(BDSG) The BDSG (2009) refines the
Directive 95/46/EC and allows the pro-
cessing of personal data only if permit-
ted by law or the explicit consent of
a customer (BDSG:4). Transmission of
personal data to third parties, possibly
in other countries, may only happen if
an appropriate level of security is given
(BDSG:4.b). Customers have the right
to have their records updated or deleted
(BDSG:6). Technical and organizational
security must be provided by the process-
ing company, mainly access control and
usage control (BDSG:9). Third parties
providing additional processing must ad-
here to the same rules (BDSG:11). Also,
processing must follow a certain purpose
(BDSG:28), and companies must inform
their customers about how personal data
is being used (BDSG:34).
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) Focus-
ing on the financial sector, the GLB
mostly describes affiliations between
banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies (GLB 1999). GLB:501 a and
b demand that so-called “nonpublic per-
sonal information” (NPPI) must be pro-
tected by establishing appropriate secu-
rity standards. GLB:502 forbids disclos-
ing NPPI to third parties, neither directly
nor through affiliates. GLB:503 demands
that financial institutions inform cus-
tomers about the current privacy pol-
icy. The related, cross-sector regulation
Sarbanes-Oxley-Act (SOX 2002) is even
more abstract from a workflow point
of view and does not contain any rules
directly pertaining to workflows.
Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (HIPAA) The HIPAA Ad-
ministrative Rule regulates the use of
health data. Of the presented compliance
sources, HIPAA is the most detailed one
regarding workflow rules. For this reason,
it serves as our running example and con-
cludes this survey.
While the security part (subpart C of
part 164) demands general security pre-
cautions, the privacy part (subpart E of
part 164) describes how PHI may be
used in workflows. Based upon a “default
deny” approach (HIPAA:164.502.a), PHI
may only be used or disclosed for treat-
ment, payment, or health care operations
purposes (HIPAA:164.502.a.1). A “min-
imum necessary” (HIPAA:164.502.b) re-
quirement holds for both the sender
and the receiver of PHI: If a contracted
third party receives PHI which it does
not require by the contract, the re-
ceiving side is obliged to inform the
sending side (HIPAA:164.504.e.2.ii.C).
As usual, the patient’s consent must
be obtained before using or disclos-
ing any PHI (HIPAA:164.506.a.1) and
if PHI is used or disclosed without
consent, this must be documented and
resolved later (HIPAA:164.506.a.3.C.ii).
Certain PHI may be used without au-
thorization, e.g., for directory purposes
within a hospital (HIPAA:164.510.a.1),
but other PHI require extra authoriza-
tion to be used/disclosed, e.g., psy-
chotherapy notes (HIPAA:164.508.a.2).
Patients may request to restrict the use
and disclosure of their PHI to cer-
tain elements (HIPAA:164.502.c), have
a right to be informed about their
PHI (HIPAA:164.524.a.1) within a cer-
tain amount of time (30 days, see
HIPAA:164.524.b.2.i). Also, patients have
the right to be provided with a list of their
PHI’s disclosures over the last six years
(HIPAA:164.528), and may ask to have
their PHI amended (HIPAA:164.526.a.1).
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Table 1 Classification of Compliance Rules
HIPAA 95/45/EC OECD BDSG TMG GLB
↔ Inform customers about policy/usage √ √ √ √ √ √
↔ Obtain customer consent √ √ √ √ √
↔ Check third parties √ √ √ √
↔ Update customer records √ √ √
↔ Delete after use √ √
Treat special data separately
√ √
Use for specific purpose
√ √ √ √ √
Use pseudonyms or de-identify
√ √ √
Limit to minimum necessary
√ √ √
Such amendments must then be for-
warded by the amending institution
(HIPAA:164.526.c), e.g., a hospital, to all
involved parties which must accept that
amendment (HIPAA:164.526.e) and up-
date their records accordingly.
3.2 Compliance Rule Classification
The workflow related sections of the
above compliance regulations can be or-
ganized in a few basic classes of rules, as
shown in Table 1.
The rule categories in the second left
column were obtained by sifting through
the compliance sources in the top row
and listing all rules that directly pertain to
either the control flow (e.g., some activity
has to happen before another) or the data
flow (e.g., treatment of documents and
their content) of workflows. After consol-
idating those rules that only used slightly
different wording to describe the same re-
quirement, the nine categories remained.
Given these nine categories, we trans-
formed the corresponding rules into a
Petri net representation as described in
Sect. 4. Then, we analyzed the represen-
tations for similarities and differences. It
showed that most of the rules (5 out of 9)
referred to the order of activities, and two
each referred to the workflow’s branching
conditions and the data being processed.
The resulting three rule classes are sym-
bolized by the icons in the very left col-
umn. A double headed arrow for cat-
egories that require certain activities to
(not) be performed before or after other
activities. A single headed branching ar-
row for categories describing the flow of
data. Finally, a rectangular label stands
for categories directly relating to data el-
ements.
Access control is important for Cloud-
based workflows, but it is not sufficient
for covering all the above rule classes.
While access control covers the first re-
lease of data, it neither covers further
releases nor additional uses. In the E-
Health scenario, a health professional
could obtain PHI with the stated pur-
pose of treatment, and then use it for an-
other purpose, e.g., advertising, in a fol-
lowing activity. In contrast to other clas-
sifications and taxonomies of compliance
requirements, such as (Breaux and Antón
2008), (Wagner 2002) and (Sadiq et al.
2007), which address only a single legis-
lation, the classification presented draws
its categorization from different legisla-
tions, thereby being more suitable for
Cloud providers, which have to simul-
taneously comply with multiple regu-
lations and contractual terms (service-
level agreements). In particular, Com-
cert checks usage control, without which
many compliance requirements cannot
be covered. This way, the new approach
extends previous work in usage control
(Park and Sandhu 2004 provide a model
to capture usage control rules, Pretschner
et al. 2006 present an enforcement mech-
anism) to the analysis at designtime.
4 The Comcert Approach
Petri nets are well-suited for reasoning
about workflows (van der Aalst 1998), as
they provide an adequate formal seman-
tics for workflow specifications in BPMN,
BPEL and EPC (Lohmann et al. 2009).
Building upon their standard definition
(Murata 1989), Comcert uses Petri nets
to formalize both workflows and rules.
Under the assumption that, with their
graphical representation, Petri nets are
more intuitive than the complex formu-
las of, e.g., linear temporal logic, this of-
fers the advantage of making the com-
pliance check comprehensible for a wider
group of users while still delivering sound
results.
The main idea behind Comcert’s anal-
ysis is to transform a workflow into one
Petri net and the rules into additional
ones. Rule adherence is determined by
traversing each path of the workflow
and triggering the according transitions
in the rule Petri net (RPN) for each
workflow activity. Similar to security au-
tomata (Schneider 2000), each RPN con-
tains special places which, after the work-
flow has been traversed completely, either
indicate rule adherence or a violation.
Comcert is suitable for the automated
detection of design vulnerabilities at
workflow level. Regarding other levels,
such as software and hardware, different
approaches are required (Lowis and Ac-
corsi 2010). Overall, certification and ver-
ification techniques are tailored for a par-
ticular workflow notation. Comcert ab-
stracts away from the particular notation
and employs a Petri net meta-model for
both the workflow and the rules, resp.
compliance requirements representation.
Details of Comcert’s Petri net defini-
tions will be given when introducing the
analysis patterns. First, we discuss the




Workflow nets are employed as a tar-
get meta-model to formalize workflows
(van der Aalst 1998). A workflow net is
a special kind of Petri net with distinct
source and sink places where all the nodes
lie on some path between the source and
the sink place. A token in the source place
denotes a new execution (so-called case),
whereas a token in the sink place denotes
a complete execution (end of a case). The
following illustrates the transformation
of workflows into workflow nets.
Example 1 BPMN offers three main el-
ements for the formalization of a work-
flow’s control flow: activities, events, and
gateways. Figure 2a illustrates some of
these elements. The boxes stand for ac-
tivities (or tasks), x-gateways for the ex-
clusive choice (left-hand side) and simple
merge (right-hand side). The circle in the
left denotes the start event, whereas the
bold circle in the right stands for the end
event.
The corresponding workflow net de-
rived from Fig. 2a is depicted in Fig. 2b.
148 Business & Information Systems Engineering 3|2011
BISE – RESEARCH PAPER
Fig. 2 Exemplary BPMN
and workflow net
representation
Place p2 is called an “OR-split” and p3 an
“OR-join”.
The transformation of workflow de-
scriptions into workflow nets can be gen-
erally automated, e.g., with Oryx (2010)
and SAP Galaxy (Saha 2008). The pre-
cision of the generated model varies
according to the source workflow. For
BPMN, for example, there are mappings
which restrict the original model to hav-
ing a single start and end event (Dijkman
et al. 2008). Moreover, activities with
multiple concurrent instances, as well as
some kinds of gateways, such as OR-
gateways, cannot generally be mapped
into workflow nets. Similarly, only a
particular class of EPC models can be
mapped into workflow nets (van Don-
gen et al. 2007). In contrast to that,
the “feature-complete” transformation of
BPEL workflows is possible, e.g. with
WofBPEL (Ouyang et al. 2005). Com-
cert uses workflow nets with extended
annotations. It employs the tool BW2PN
(IIG 2010) to transform a BPEL workflow
with its WSDL specification into a Petri
net stored as Petri Net Markup Language
(PNML). BW2PN ignores certain BPEL
features such as fault or exception han-
dlers, so that compact, small Petri nets
can be created. This is a trade-off be-
tween feature completeness and readabil-
ity. If the scenario demands including ex-
ception handling, other tools can be used
to create feature complete Petri nets.
4.2 Comcert Patterns for Compliance
Rule Representation
Comcert assesses the compliance of a
workflow by analyzing the five estab-
lished elements required to check for rule
adherence in workflows: activities, data,
location, resources, and time limits (Cur-
tis et al. 1992; Stohr and Zhao 2001;
Sadiq et al. 2007; Svirskas et al. 2007;
COMPAS 2008; Breaux 2009; Cabanillas
et al. 2010).
A rule describes which activities may,
must or must not be performed on what
objects by which roles. In addition, a rule
can further prescribe the order of activ-
ities, i.e. which activities have to happen
before or after other activities.
The formalization of rules as Petri nets
patterns has been proposed by Katt et al.
(2009) and Huang and Kirchner (2009).
In contrast to Katt et al., Huang and
Kirchner cannot cope with the expression
of usage control policies. Katt et al. em-
ploy Usage Control Colored Petri Nets
(UCPN) for the formalization and en-
forcement of diverse types of obligations,
i.e. actions to be performed before, dur-
ing and after an activities. However, their
approach assumes that the rules are inte-
grated into the workflow, so that UCPN
cannot be singled out for reuse for other
workflows. Acting as a security automata
(Schneider 2000), rules in Comcert are
captured as Petri net patterns and are not
integrated into the workflow. Together
with the classification of compliance re-
quirements, this makes it possible to or-
ganize compliance rules in categories ac-
cording to their intent and semantics,
thereby facilitating their formalization as
re-usable Petri net patterns or templates
in other modular policy languages for us-
age control.
Comcert captures rules as Petri net pat-
terns. A rule Petri net (RPN for short)
consists of the standard Petri net ele-
ments places P (depicted as circles), tran-
sitions T (rectangles), arcs A (lines) and
tokens (dots). Arcs connect either P to
T or T to P, and tokens are always
contained in a place. Places immediately
leading to a transition are this transition’s
source places, places immediately follow-
ing a transition are this transition’s sink
places. A transition is active if its source
places contain tokens; an active transition
can fire. Upon firing, a transition con-
sumes tokens from its source places and
produces tokens in its sink places. Stan-
dard firing behavior is to consume one
token of each source place and to produce
one token in each sink place.
Within a Cloud-based workflow, mul-
tiple locations can be involved in one
workflow, especially when services are
outsourced to other countries. Each ele-
ment of a net can carry predicates, which
are used to describe further details, e.g.,
about the location of an activity or the
emergency status of a patient. Such pred-
icates are used to enable extended firing
behavior.
Extended firing rules are introduced to
make the firing behavior of some transi-
tions deterministic (in Fig. 3, determin-
istic transitions resp. transitions with ex-
tended firing rules carry a dotted rect-
angle inside). These transitions fire in
dependency of token and activity predi-
cates, including tokens (not) being avail-
able in certain places. In Fig. 3 for exam-
ple, transition A in Pattern a fires in de-
pendency of an activity’s location, tran-
sition B in Pattern e fires in dependency
of a token being present in the place
flag. Using extended firing rules reduces
the visual complexity of the RPNs be-
cause it requires (in some cases, much)
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Fig. 3 Rule Petri net patterns (excerpt)
fewer places and transitions than a stan-
dard Petri net would require for the same
tasks.
RPN places can have different seman-
tics, the two most important ones are in-
dicated by OK and ERR in Fig. 3. A to-
ken in OK signals rule adherence of the
corresponding workflow path. Rule vio-
lations are identified through tokens in
ERR. Section 4.3 will sketch how tokens
and workflow paths are linked through
the coloring resp. numbering of tokens.
Transforming and refining a natural
language policy into a RPN is supported
through RPN patterns. Rules for each of
the five elements activities, data, loca-
tions, resources, and time limits can be
transformed with these patterns. Because
of space constraints, we only present a se-
lection of patterns in the remainder of
this section.
Pattern a in Fig. 3 serves to detect the
presence of required activities. As long as
the activity A (transition A in the pattern)
is not found in the workflow model, the
RPN remains in its initial state, indicat-
ing an error through a token in the place
ERR. If and when the activity A is en-
countered while scanning the workflow
model, transition A in the RPN fires. This
removes the token from ERR and creates
a new one in OK. At the end of the work-
flow, the RPN then shows adherence to
the rule that activity A must be present
in the workflow: a token in OK signals
adherence, a token in ERR means a vio-
lation. Inverting the semantics (OK be-
comes ERR and vice versa) allows check-
ing for the absence of forbidden activi-
ties.
With the RPN Pattern b, it is straight-
forward to check for the location of an
activity’s execution. When the activity A
is found in the workflow model, the tran-
sition A fires in dependency of the ac-
tivity’s location, which must be available
through, e.g., an annotated predicate. If
the location matches the required one, a
token in OK is created, signaling rule ad-
herence. A forbidden location causes the
production of a token in ERR, indicat-
ing a rule violation. Because the workflow
model may contain the activity A mul-
tiple times, the firing does not consume
any tokens, which again is part of the ex-
tended firing behavior.
If data elements must be processed by
a certain activity after their first occur-
rence in the workflow model, Pattern c
can check adherence to this rule. The first
occurrence of the data element dat causes
the transition dat to fire and produce a
token in ERR, where it remains as long as
the activity A does not process the data
element in the workflow model. Transi-
tion A will remove the token from ERR
and create a new one in OK otherwise.
The deletion of a data element before
the workflow’s end can be checked for
with Pattern d. When a token in flag
shows that the data element dat has been
used, an activity that deletes dat will trig-
ger the transition Del which removes the
flag token and creates a new one in OK. If
dat has not been deleted when the work-
flow reaches its end, the transition End
puts a token in ERR.
Typical correctness or soundness re-
quirements for Petri nets include being
free of deadlocks, leading from start to
end on all or at least one path, and
not leaving any tokens in non-end places
(Trčka et al. 2009). Tokens are possibly
left behind when an AND switch is fol-
lowed by an OR join. The notion of “cor-
responding pairs” has been introduced
for the according analyses (Liu and Ku-
mar 2005). Pattern d has the same struc-
ture as the pattern for corresponding
pairs of AND switches with AND joins.
Assume the renaming of dat to AND-
switch, Del to AND-join, and End to OR-
join. For every opening AND switch in
the workflow, a token in flag is created. If
a closing AND join follows, the flag token
is deleted and a new one is put in OK, in-
dicating a corresponding pair. If a closing
OR join follows, the flag token is deleted
and ERR receives a new one, signaling
that potentially, at this point a token has
been created in the workflow model with-
out being consumed before the end of the
workflow.
Checking for the order of activities is
more complex, as Pattern e shows. The
rule is that activity B may only happen if
activity A was performed before. In the
pattern, transition A fires when activity
A is found, producing a token in place
OK/flag. Upon activity B in the workflow
model, transition B fires. Both transitions
A and B have extended firing rules. If a to-
ken in OK/flag is present, activity A has
been performed before and B creates a
token in OK. If OK/flag is empty, a to-
ken in ERR is created, showing that B
occurs in the workflow model before A,
which is against the rule. To further sup-
port the analyst, the pattern will also in-
dicate if the activities A and B happen in
the wrong order. In that case, B will have
produced a token in ERR before A fires.
If A finds a token in ERR, it produces a
token in the place WrongOrder instead of
OK/flag.
Some rules set time limits for starting
or ending an activity, but actual execu-
tion times cannot be determined at de-
signtime. Still, even at designtime evi-
dence of possible violations can be ob-
tained by assuming the use of control ac-
tivities. Such control activities check the
actual execution times during runtime
and create a warning if a time limit rule
is violated. Checking for the presence of
such control activities in the workflow
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Fig. 4 Comcert analysis algorithm
model, Comcert indicates possible viola-
tions of time limits. With a pattern simi-
lar to Pattern e, Comcert checks whether
a workflow model contains the required
control activities in the desired order.
Please note a small but important differ-
ence to Pattern e: While in Pattern e, the
rule allows that A occurs without B fol-
lowing, in the pattern for control activi-
ties it is a rule violation if A occurs with-
out an afterward control activity.
4.3 Comcert Analysis
The compliance survey in Sect. 3 shows
that although compliance regulations
contain various rules, the compliance or
rule adherence of workflows can be deter-
mined by checking for a few types of rule
classes. Analyzing the control flow and
data flow in a workflow model with re-
spect to the five elements activities, data,
locations, resources, and time limits cov-
ers these classes. While presenting the
analysis algorithm, the Petri net contain-
ing the workflow will be referred to as
workflow model, and the Petri nets con-
taining the rules will be referred to as
RPNs.
Filling the patterns of Sect. 4.2 with ac-
tual values that correspond to a workflow
leads to RPNs that are ready for anal-
ysis. The names of activities, data ele-
ments, locations and resources should be
used consistently between the workflow,
the workflow model, the natural language
or XML-style rules, and the RPN. With-
out consistent naming, a mapping must
be available so that the analysis algo-
rithm can determine which element in
the workflow model corresponds to what
element in the RPN.
For the patterns that carry predicates,
the workflow and rule attributes must be
assigned to the transitions and tokens of a
RPN. Comcert uses colored Petri net to-
kens to differentiate between control flow
tokens and data flow tokens. In addition,
data flow tokens have colors that indi-
cate the type of data element and resource
they represent.
Comcert analyzes a workflow model
for rule adherence by following each path
from the workflow’s start to its end and
triggering the corresponding RPN transi-
tions along the way. Correspondence de-
pends on several aspects. Basically, the
names of workflow and rule transitions
are compared. Upon encountering a cer-
tain workflow transition, the rule transi-
tions with the same name are triggered,
firing if the required tokens are available
in the RPN.
The extended firing behavior men-
tioned above results from considering
predicates and the available tokens. For
each source place it can be defined how
many (including null) tokens of which
kind (control token, data elements to-
ken) are required for firing and will be
consumed when firing. How many and
which tokens will be produced in which
sink place can be defined accordingly.
For some of the patterns, a transition
name comparison is sufficient, e.g., for
Pattern a that checks for the presence
of required activities. Checking for data
deletion as in Pattern d requires that ei-
ther there is a transition with a unique
name, e.g., “delete”, or that a transition
carries a “delete” annotation.
Some patterns will always yield a
boolean decision, e.g., checking for a re-
quired order of activities with Pattern e.
Other patterns depend on certain predi-
cates being evaluable, i.e., certain work-
flow model attributes being available. For
practical application, those patterns can
be extended with an end place that sig-
nals an unresolved analysis result. For ex-
ample, Pattern b would then indicate rule
adherence with tokens in OK, rule vio-
lations with tokens in ERR, and occur-
rences of unresolved cases with tokens in
a place called, e.g., UNRES. Comcert sup-
ports the indication of missing annota-
tions by creating “unresolved” tokens of
a certain color whenever the rule adher-
ence of a workflow activity, data element,
resource or time limit cannot be resolved.
While visiting each path through the
workflow model, Comcert triggers the
applicable RPNs, so that finally, the RPN
tokens indicate rule adherence or rule
violation, depending on the semantics
of the place they reside in. Each path
receives its own number, following the
scheme of binary trees, but extended to
more than two possible branches. For
example, 3.4.1 marks the path that is
reached when taking the third branch of
the first split, then the fourth branch of
the second split, and the first branch of
the third split. For space reasons, further
details have to be omitted. Analysis with
this numbering scheme allows an unlim-
ited number of branches and includes
loop detection. Analysis complexity will
be discussed below.
With a workflow model and a set of
RPN at hand, the Comcert analysis algo-
rithm is described by the pseudo code de-
picted in Fig. 4.
Example 2 In the Workflow 1 (top of
Fig. 5), a hospital requests PHI for treat-
ment purposes. The EHR provider then
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Fig. 5 Exemplary workflow with according rule Petri net
wants to create a document out of this
PHI and send it to a third party. How-
ever, instantiating Pattern e for the or-
der of activities, the RPN (right side of
Fig. 5) rules that the activity “Obtain
Consent” must be performed before the
EHR provider is allowed to “Send Docu-
ment”. Upon finding the workflow transi-
tion “Obtain Consent” after “Send Doc-
ument” in Workflow 1, Comcert sets the
RPN to the state “WrongOrder” (indi-
cated by the token “1” in the RPN). This
information can be used to fix the work-
flow.
Now let us assume the workflow con-
tains the required activities in the correct
order as shown in Workflow 2 (bottom of
Fig. 5). “Send Document” happens after
“Obtain Consent”, so a token (numbered
“2” in Fig. 5) in the place OK is created.
In this case, the workflow adheres to the
rule and a corresponding certificate can
be issued.
Some other approaches first create all
traces (paths through the Petri net) and
then analyze those traces in a second step
(Meda et al. 2010). Comcert performs
both tasks at once by creating unique
control tokens for each workflow path
within the Petri nets. Flooding the net in
this way makes sure that every path is vis-
ited while at the same time allowing the
analysis of single traces resp. paths.
Comcert, just like other Petri net anal-
ysis algorithms, has to cope with the state
space explosion problem. In the worst
case, the analysis runtime is exponential
to the number of branching places and
transitions in the workflow model. We do
not expect this to be a problem in prac-
tice, because typical industrial workflows
do not contain more than a few hundred
activities. For example, the Comcert pro-
totype analyzed a workflow model that
contained more than 300 places and 300
transitions, resulting in more than 7000
workflow paths, in less than 2 seconds on
a 1.2 GHz processor, using less than 6MB
of memory. While tests have shown that
nested loops considerably increase analy-
sis time and memory usage, typical work-
flow models consisting of up to a few
hundred places and transitions can be an-
alyzed in seconds. In fact, small work-
flows of about 100 activities mostly re-
quired less than 15 ms to analyze.
The above example exhibits a useful
property of Comcert. Besides the cer-
tification of a workflow, the approach
also provides for pointers to flaws in the
workflow, along with the affected part of
the rule being violated. For example, the
annotated error state that results from
the analysis of the flawed Workflow 1 in
Fig. 5 identifies the missing activity “ob-
tain consent” between Step 1 and Step 2
of the workflow. With patterns such as
Pattern e, Comcert is able to even identify
those activities in the workflow that occur
too late, i.e., would make the workflow
adhere to the rule if they occurred ear-
lier. When activities occur in the wrong
order, such as “obtain consent” and “send
document” in Fig. 5, the required order
of activities can be displayed to the an-
alyst. Based on this automated identifi-
cation, flaws can be corrected with auto-
mated process rewriting as described by
Höhn (2009).
5 Summary
A chief requirement for the provision
of sustainable Cloud Computing is the
ability to certify the adherence of busi-
ness processes to regulatory require-
ments. Currently, certification is manual,
which is definitely at odds with the dy-
namics and flexibility offered by, e.g., the
Software as a Service paradigm. The busi-
ness models behind modern service tech-
nologies in general and Cloud Comput-
ing in particular essentially depend on
business processes being tailored to the
individual needs of customers. Failing to
reliably support adaptivity will hamper
the widespread adoption of Cloud Com-
puting.
This paper provides two main contri-
butions: A classification of compliance
rules, and Comcert, an automated ap-
proach for the certification of business
process compliance. Comcert is a well-
founded approach based on Petri nets
that allows a company, an auditor or a
customer to check whether a business
process, formalized in standard languages
such as BPMN and BPEL, adheres to
compliance requirements. In the event
of noncompliance, the resultant evidence
indicates the flawed fragments of the pro-
cess. To further facilitate the certification
process, this paper also classifies recur-
ring types of compliance requirements,
demonstrating how to formalize them as
Petri net patterns for subsequent verifica-
tion.
The analysis results do not formally
prove that under all circumstances the
workflow will adhere to all compliance
rules at runtime. Rather, Comcert pro-
duces evidence of a workflow model’s
rule adherence, or, in the case of non-
adherence, identifies design vulnerabili-
ties. For example, in the health care sce-
nario, compliance violations can be iden-
tified at a very early point in time, so
that design vulnerabilities regarding the
treatment of EHR data can be resolved
before patients file HIPAA complaints.
This avoids or reduces remediation costs,
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which typically are very high when vul-
nerabilities are fixed later. Even though
no formal proof in the strict sense is
achieved, a complete analysis in the style
of model checking is performed. The re-
sults are summarized in a compliance
certificate that demonstrates the work-
flow’s rule adherence.
Completeness of the checks is achieved
in the sense that for all defined rule pat-
terns, every occurrence of a pattern is
detected within the workflows. However,
rule pattern completeness is undecidable
in general, because there is no formal way
of proving that future attackers will not
be able to think of new attacks against
which additional rules would have to be
defined. Overall, the goal of Comcert is
to ease and automate compliance checks
and provide adequate tool support. Com-
panies can use Comcert to check work-
flows for rule adherence, either when
about to put (parts of) their own work-
flows into the Cloud, or for certification
to signal potential industrial or private
customers that data will be processed in
a compliant way.
Experiments carried out with Com-
cert demonstrate that it effectively detects
possible compliance violations in work-
flows. While the rule patterns – captur-
ing explicit information flow, i.e., con-
trol flow and data flow characteristics –
account for the most relevant proper-
ties in practice, subtle structural vulner-
abilities within the implicit information
flow cannot yet be detected using Com-
cert. Such subtle vulnerabilities poten-
tially lead to information leaks, which are
not acceptable in high security scenarios.
To also suit to such certification (Accorsi
and Wonnemann 2011), we plan to ex-
tend Comcert with patterns to identify
the so-called “covert-channels” (Lamp-
son 1973).
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